U.S. - MEXICAN RELATIONS (1910-1940): HOW DID THE UNITED STATES COME TO TERMS WITH THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, AND HOW DID THE REVOLUTION COME TO TERMS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

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Abstract

In this essay the author uses five classical studies, which he considers are still valid and appealing in several respects, with the main purpose of determining which of the two countries, Mexico or the United States, ceded the most in terms of the changes that the Mexican Revolution and the governments that emerged from it intended to establish in Mexico. In doing so, the author explains how differences and similarities in ideology between governments in both countries over time played a substantial role in the final outcome of the Revolution, and how external factors, such as the two world wars and the relations that Mexico held with other countries, mainly Germany, were also important for this outcome. The author concludes that from an economic point of view, it is possible to see that although the U.S. was able to manipulate the Mexican policy related to oil, and the land reform program in Mexico in its early years was limited, these conditions changed during Cárdenas term (1934-40). In this sense, according to the author, Cárdenas’s land reform program and the nationalization of oil industry during his period made U.S. direct investment, which after the armed Revolution represented more than one thousand million dollars, to fall in more than a half.

Keywords

Relations, Ideology, Revolution, Reforms

By using five classical studies, which are still considered valid and appealing in several respects, in this essay I aim at determining which of the two countries, Mexico or the United States, gave up the most in terms of the changes that the Mexican Revolution and

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the governments that emerged from it intended to establish in Mexico. In doing so, I will show how differences and similarities in ideology between governments in both countries over time played a substantial role in the final outcome of the Revolution, and how external factors, such as the two world wars and the relations that Mexico held with other countries, mainly Germany, were also important for this outcome.

Close to the end of Díaz’s last period, the relations between Mexico and the U.S. were cordial in general terms. There were certain Mexican policies that the U.S. did not agree with, particularly the special support that Díaz had given to European investment over U.S. investment (Katz, 1981: 21-27). However, the Mexican government never limited U.S. investment, and the United States was well satisfied with the order and progress that Díaz had given to Mexico, which was ideal for the protection of U.S. economic interests in this country and the few U.S. population settled there. At the same time, during Díaz’s last administration, the U.S. government perceived that he was losing control of the internal policy of the country, and, in this sense, they showed more concern about the protection of their interests and people than with bringing support to the old regime (Blasier, 1985: 18). Proof of this was that at first the U.S. government did not launch a strong campaign to arrest Madero or to stop his action when he was in U.S. territory preparing his revolutionary program. Actually, there was a sympathetic attitude of some sectors of the U.S. public opinion towards Madero and his followers. This became clear in February, 1911, when Madero, confronting an arrest warrant in the U.S., returned to Mexico with a group of 130 men of whom 50 were U.S. volunteers (Stanley, Ross, cit. by Blasier: 20).

The concordance in ideology between Madero’s followers and some U.S. groups is a fact that began to become clear in the first years of the twentieth century, when the American progressive ideology, which included “moralistic critiques of boss politics; a concern for honest, representative government and civil duty; ... democratic electoral mobilization”, was “significantly borrowed” by Madero’s movement (Knight, 1987: 4). When Díaz resigned, the temporary presidency of Francisco Leon de la Barra, the former Mexican ambassador in the U.S. and Minister of Foreign Relations, permitted the continuity of good diplomatic relations between the two countries. In fact, the U.S. government helped to stop the counterrevolutionary project that Bernardo Reyes, a general who had been close to Díaz regime, was planning in Texas. However, when Madero took power at the end of 1911, the relations between the two countries soon became negative. One important cause for this situation was that Madero was not able to keep the order that had characterized the country before. The ambassador in Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, considered Madero’s democratizing program as unviable due to the prevailing social conditions of poverty and illiteracy (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 118).

The lack of law and order caused a threat to the U.S. economic interests in Mexico. In fact, the protection of these interests was one of the main responsibilities of the American ambassador in Mexico.
The democratizing plan of Madero could have been positive for Mexico’s future, but particularly for the U.S. Republican government in power at that time, what mattered was the security of their people and economic interests in Mexico. Lane Wilson, who maintained close relations with the American interests in Mexico, was particularly hostile to Madero, and his attitude was reflected in the reports that he sent to Washington, where he usually described the Mexican government as “apathetic, inefficient, cynically indifferent and stupidly optimistic” (Vázquez and Meyer: 120). President William H. Taft was influenced by these considerations, and although he did not support an armed intervention in Mexico, in part due to the sympathy of the U.S. public opinion towards the Mexican cause at that moment, his perception about Mexico turned more to the side of that of his ambassador in Mexico. This is a clear example of how the difference in objectives between the U.S. and Mexican administrations had a decisive effect on the Mexican revolutionary path. In fact, Henry Lane Wilson became one of the main architects of Madero’s violent overthrowing by establishing an alliance with opposition generals, Felix Díaz and Victoriano Huerta, which on February, 1913 led to the arrests and assassinations of President Madero and Vice-president Pino Suárez.

The new Democratic president, Woodrow Wilson, more than his predecessor Taft, was a close follower of progressive ideas. He particularly believed that moral principles had to govern not only internal policy, but also foreign relations (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 124). In addition, he was in favor of the development of stable governments and societies in Latin America, not guaranteed by military dictatorships, but by liberal democratic systems (Blasier, 1985: 102). In addition, at first he did not show a hostile attitude towards the Mexican Revolution and its factions because he thought that the outcome of this struggle would be positive for Mexican society (Blasier: 103). He condemned the violent overthrow of Madero and strove to bring down the military dictatorship imposed by Victoriano Huerta. However, the interventionist position he assumed towards Mexico was never accepted by the majority of the revolutionary factions, which were also against the dictatorship of Huerta. On more than one occasion, Carranza, the leader of the revolutionary faction known as the Constitutionalists, showed a very nationalist position that at times could have been perceived as xenophobic. For instance, although the American invasion of Veracruz in 1914, which marginally contributed to Huerta’s resignation, reinforced Carranza’s power, he perceived it as highly offensive (Blasier: 103). Despite Wilson’s goodwill, relations between the two countries remained tense until the end of his term in the early 1920’s.

The years between 1914 and 1917 in Mexico were characterized by the internal struggle between the revolutionary factions, which could not negotiate a peaceful transition to a new government. In October 1915, partly due to Carranza’s military superiority over the other revolutionaries, the United States recognized him, albeit reluctantly.

It is important to mention that the international conflict that occurred between 1914-1918 played an important role in the decisions that the U.S. took towards Mexico.
in those years. First, the evacuation of the American forces from Veracruz in November, 1914 was in part the result of the beginning of World War I. The United States did not want to keep his armed forces in Mexico under the prevailing global violent conditions. In addition, the recognition of Carranza by the U.S. government was in part product of the German intention to keep both countries, Mexico and the U.S., in struggle, in order to prevent the supply of arms from the U.S. to the Western Allies or the entry of that country into the War (Katz, 1981).

After Carranza’s recognition, the instability present in the Mexican north was manifested in events such as the Villista attack on Columbus, New Mexico on March, 1916, which offended the American population. Now, the U.S. sent an armed incursion led by General John Pershing to capture Villa for the second time. However, Carranza always kept a rigid attitude towards fulfilling the demands of the United States. In this case, the War played again a decisive role in the U.S. policy towards Mexico. When the U.S. entry to the War became a fact, Pershing’s troops left the country, and Carranza never accepted the imposed conditions for this evacuation. Basically, these conditions were related to the protection of the lives and property of foreigners and the alleviation of the conditions that had caused disorders along the border (Blasier, 1985: 105).

Once again the Mexican Revolution successfully resisted U.S. pressures. As mentioned above, an international event, World War I, and the sympathetic position of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson towards Mexico, as well as other factors, such as the rigid and nationalistic position that Carranza showed to the United States, had permitted the Mexican government not to give up to U.S. demands, such as the establishment of a government negotiated by the U.S. and the implementation of specific policies to protect U.S. interests in Mexico.

Another factor well managed by Carranza, which fortified México’s ability to avoid intimidation by the U.S., was the negotiation of a possible alliance with Germany (Katz, 1981). Carranza was conscious that Germany had supported his enemies, Huerta and Villa, however with the Pershing expedition against Villa, Carranza considered establishing an alliance with that country. What Germany was really looking for was to provoke more tensions between the United States and Mexico. However, Mexico left the possibility of an alliance open with Germany in order to pressure for the evacuation of Pershing’s forces. In addition, the international conflict also encouraged a friendly attitude of Wilson towards Mexico, despite the preparation of a new nationalist Constitution by Mexican revolutionary forces. This was the result of Wilson’s belief that cordiality towards Carranza, including recognition, would be the only way to prevent him from surrendering to German influences (see Katz).

The content of the New Mexican Constitution, which came into force in 1917, became one of the most important topics of the Mexican-U.S. relations for more than 20 years. This document contained many elements considered offensive by the U.S. and to the prevailing capitalist order: the power of the Mexican government to expropriate...
properties owned by natives and foreigners and the elimination of the right to own sub-soil deposits (Art.27); the creation of an article (Art. 123) which protected and gave new rights to workers; and the power to expel foreigners at any time, among others (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 135). The U.S. was particularly concerned with the elimination of the diplomatic protection that had guaranteed a special legal treatment to foreigners in Mexico and with the retroactivity of the law in terms of property rights of oil deposits (Vázquez and Meyer: 135). This was an issue that would create a constant debate between the two nations until President Lazaro Cárdenas’s oil expropriation in 1938.

It is worth noting that during the first years after the Mexican Revolution, the Constitution was not fully implemented against American interests in Mexico. It was more the possibility given by the Constitution to threaten those U.S. interests what caused a conflict between the two countries. In fact, the position with which the United States emerged from World War I - the U.S. was close to becoming the most powerful nation of the world-hindered the application of the Mexican constitutional principles. At the same time, Carranza had earned the hostility of more than one powerful group in Europe because of his previous intention to ally with Germany and the creation of a nationalist Constitution. Under these conditions, Mexico was more alone than ever. Thus, the external forces that had permitted Carranza to confront the U.S. had now disappeared.

Some factors helped to further fracture the relations between Mexico and the U.S. at the end of Carranza’s period: First, Carranza issued a decree in 1918, which confirmed the nationalistic tendency shown by the Constitution. This decree declared that, without any exception, all oil deposits were owned by the nation. This strengthens the discontent particularly of powerful private sector groups in the U.S. In addition, William Jenkins, a wealthy American entrepreneur, who at that time held the position of American consul in the city of Puebla in Mexico, was supposedly kidnapped in October 1919. This increased the discontent of the U.S. government. In fact, Álvaro Obregón, the following Mexican president, would have to pay for the actions and mistakes of his predecessor.

At the beginning of the 1920s, the administrations of both countries changed. Obregón took office in Mexico and Warren Harding in the U.S. Now the recognition of the Mexican government was subjected to various conditions imposed by the U.S. government. In addition, to the claims for damages caused by the recent Mexican civil war, as well as other previous claims, the Mexican Constitution became a major concern for Harding. His administration “was more friendly to private business interests than the old” (Blasier, 1985: 116). In this sense, its main policy towards Mexico became “the safeguarding of property rights against confiscation” (Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, cit. by Blasier. 116). As a result, the non-retroactive application of Article 27 of the Constitution, which referred to the nation’s ownership of Mexican soil and subsoil, generated a constant problem between the two countries during the 1920’s. Actually, the U.S. conditioned the recognition of Obregón onto the elimination of those constitutional principles that represented a threat to American interests. The Mexican government, on
the other hand, would not modify the principles of the Constitution because that would mean compromising the country’s sovereignty. However, for Obregón, the recognition of his government represented an aspect of considerable importance. He needed this recognition in order to obtain foreign credit, revitalize the economy, and getting arms to protect his regime from internal uprisings. In this sense, Obregón applied a different strategy to achieve the much needed recognition.

The most important issue for the U.S. was oil; so, in order to convince Americans of his good disposition towards them, Obregón supported some U.S. oil companies that had filed lawsuits against the retroactivity of the law regarding property rights of oil deposits. Obregón also renegotiated the Mexican external debt, which had been a factor of tension between the two nations.

The recognition of the Mexican government by the U.S. would not come until August, 1923 with the signing of an agreement known as the Acuerdos de Bucareli. This agreement basically created two commissions. One commission dealt with the damages that the armed Revolution had caused to U.S. interests, and the other with the complaints that citizens of both countries had presented since 1868. The Agreement also included a non-official pact that referred to how Mexico would apply its agrarian and oil legislation against U.S. interests. The important point about this non-official pact is that Obregón would never surrender to the demand of changing the Constitution to favor U.S. economic interests. The constitutional text remained unchanged. In addition, since the pact was not officially established, this condition gave the Mexican government the possibility to change its opinion and policies regarding the topics considered there.

However, it is important to highlight that Obregón had completely changed the attitude of the Mexican government towards the U.S., and the main explanation to this, as mentioned above, is that Mexico was now confronting the U.S. alone. There were no counterbalances to the relations between the two countries, such as, an international episode of the magnitude of a world war or another world power interested in Mexico. In addition, the two American presidents during Obregón’s administration, Harding and Coolidge, were Republicans, and they held a similar ideology to that of their Republican predecessor Taft. Moreover, Coolidge’s ambassador in Mexico, James R. Sheffield, maintained a hostile position towards Mexico, which coincided with that of the Republican president.

After Plutarco Elías Calles took office as president of Mexico in 1924, the clauses regarding oil established in the Acuerdos de Bucareli were nullified by the implementation of a new hydrocarbon law after December, 1925. This law confirmed that Mexico was the only owner of subsoil deposits within its borders and allowed only temporary oil exploitation concessions to foreigners. Calles was able to take these measures thanks to the flexibility left by the non-official pact mentioned above.

During that period, the U.S. also opposed the Ley de Extranjería, which established that only Mexicans could own real estate close to the Mexican coasts and frontiers. This
made the relations between the two countries tense again. However, the relations did not break thanks to a combination of factors. For example, U.S. oil companies had lost their good reputation in their own country of origin due to corrupt arrangements planned between some of them and ex Secretary of Interior, Albert Fall (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 155). In addition, the financial sector in the U.S. played on the side of Mexico. Bankers argued that Mexico had observed the Pani-Lamont agreement, which referred to the payment of its external debt, and that a possible armed intervention in Mexico, to solve matters regarding ownership of Mexican oil deposits, would only delay the solution of conflicts. President Coolidge accepted these points of view and decided to change his ambassador in Mexico, Sheffield; he appointed the banker Dwight Morrow, instead. After this change, the relations between the two countries improved notoriously. Morrow showed a better attitude towards Mexico and his personal relationship with the Mexican president became closer. The new ambassador was able to convince Calles to modify the oil legislation of 1925; this time asking him for a change on the length of oil exploitation concessions to make them perpetual. We can consider this as a victory of the U.S. over Mexico. That is to say, Mexico finally ceded to the modification of a law. However, if we make a balance on the oil issue, Mexico had won ground since the Bucareli Agreements. With the modification of the 1925’s law, Mexico would extend oil extraction concessions to perpetuity, but by then it was clear that this nation was the only owner of subsoil deposits.

Another issue that became important in the bilateral relations was the anticlericalism that the Mexican revolutionary governments had shown, particularly Calles. The Church-State relations had been tense since the armed Revolution, but the strict measures applied by President Calles towards the church after 1926 led to a major conflict, the Cristero rebellion, a popular Catholic movement that rose up against the Mexican government. In this case, American Catholics put pressure on the U.S. administration to take measures against the Mexican government. However, the U.S. government showed an “apparent indifference to the religious question” (Knight, 1987: 97). Since there was not only Catholic, but also anti-Catholic lobbying, as well as “American protestant missionaries in Mexico, hostile to Catholicism and sympathetic to the revolutionary regime” (Bastian, cit. by Knight, 1987: 98). U.S. policy makers avoided taking a partisan position. Furthermore, as some of the conflicts between the two countries had been partially solved by the presence of Dwight Morrow in Mexico, causing the relations to become friendlier, the U.S. administration avoided any substantial action in this conflict.

However, the conflict cannot be ignored. At some point, it definitively increased the tension between Mexico and the United States. This was manifested in a letter sent by Morrow in 1927, before he was assigned to the American embassy in Mexico, to Agustín Legorreta, head of the Bank of Mexico, where he emphasized this conflict by
saying that: the religious situation “was causing strife and ruin, and that, although Americans had no right to take sides in the conflict, it was a stumbling block to good relations between the two countries” (Morrow papers, cit. by Bailey, 1974: 176-177). Actually, Morrow played a fundamental role in the solution to this conflict with his insistence on the signing of an agreement between the State and the Catholic Church in Mexico in 1929. This agreement smoothed this aspect in the bilateral agenda. However, the Mexican government’s anti-religious position would not change until Cárdenas’s administration in 1934.

The Mexican external debt, which also concerned the U.S., was renegotiated again in 1930. However, the Great Depression of the 1930’s had a significant negative effect on Mexican revenues, and, consequently, on its debt payments. In 1932, the Mexican government had to postpone the payments of its debt. This time Mexico was not alone. Most Latin American countries faced a similar situation, and the United States could not do much to solve this problem.

Although the presence of Morrow had been very important for the improvement of relations between Mexico and the U.S., another positive factor was that Calles changed the direction of his policies. When Calles ended his term in 1928, he kept much of his political power. This is a period known as the Maximato (1928-1934). It is well known that Calles was the most powerful figure behind the three next Mexican presidents, until Cardenas took office in 1934. However, the United States saw as positive the gradual shift to the right of Calles after 1928. His government broke off relations with the Soviet Union, and the relations with the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the largest Mexican labor organization, weakened. In addition, land reform almost stopped (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 162). For the U.S., these measures would represent a guarantee for the fulfillment of the agreements between the two nations.

Once again, the coincidence of ideology facilitated good relations between both nations. After Calles adopted a rightist path, it seemed that the social elements of the Mexican Revolution would soon be forgotten. However, making a deeper analysis of the Sonoran dynasty (Obregón and Calles periods) we can say that the ideology of both countries had been similar in economic terms since the administration of Obregón in Mexico and that of Harding in the U.S. During the 1920’s, when these presidents governed their countries, the philosophy that led the development of both nations changed. The Republicans “traditionally the party of big business and dollar diplomacy, had recovered the white house, in part thanks to the American disillusionment with Wilson’s entangling, moralistic diplomacy” (Knight, 1987: 8).

In Mexico something similar happened. The Sonoran dynasty, which took power in 1920, did not continue on practice with the liberal tradition of Madero. Instead, they were committed to moderate social reform but in no way were against capitalism or foreign investment. Actually, in 1924, Calles declared in the United States that his governments “policy [aimed] to invite the cooperation of capitalists and industrialists of good
will” (Callahan, cit. by Knight: 7). However, except for ambassador Morrow, this time the similarities of thought were not perceived by the U.S. administration or by some ideologues, which interpreted almost every event occurring in Mexico in a negative way, and suggested intervention continuously. This had a justified reason. As Knight points out, “as the (world) war ended [the] fear to bolshevism (product of the Russian Revolution of 1917) infected American politics, profoundly influencing both foreign and domestic policy. U.S. capabilities to view revolutionary upheaval with any degree of sympathy were thus much reduced” (Knight: 7). In addition, since oil interests were particularly threatened from the 1920’s, foreign oil companies put more pressure on intervention. This time, however, there were many other internal counterweights against this attitude; for instance, the position against intervention of some Democrat U.S. Senators in Congress. In addition, other economic forces also played a counterbalancing role. In this sense, the financial sector, as mentioned above, played an important role in the change of policy towards Mexico, which favored this nation.

The following Mexican president, Lazaro Cárdenas, who was elected for the period 1934-40, returned to a nationalist discourse and applied radical social policies. For example, in his land reform program he distributed close to twenty million hectares of land, which included many properties owned by U.S. citizens. However, by this time the American administration had also changed. Franklin Roosevelt, who took office in 1933, applied two new policies, which can explain a respectful attitude that the U.S. showed towards Cardenas’s radical policies. First, the New Deal, which was an internal program directed in part to solve the U.S. economic crisis. This program took a similar direction to that applied by Cárdenas in Mexico: it supported capitalism but with an increased State intervention; at the same time, the State would play a new role in the reduction of social inequalities (Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 166). Second, the Good Neighbor Policy, which limited U.S.’s interventionist policies towards Latin America and, instead, promoted a political alliance within the hemisphere to counteract the expansionism of the Axis (Vázquez and Meyer: 166). In addition, the onset of World War II was a key factor in the respect that the United States showed towards the implementation of radical policies in Mexico.

Despite the fact that by 1936 Cardenas had implemented land expropriations that affected U.S. interests, in that year U.S. Ambassador in Mexico, Josephus Daniels, “declared that the relations between the two countries were better than ever” (Vázquez and Meyer: 167). The oil conflict that began in Mexico a few months later, and which concluded with the expropriation of foreign oil companies on March, 1938, generated a certain degree of tension between Mexico and the U.S. However, the U.S. government accepted the decision of the Mexican government under a number of conditions on the terms of compensation and payments that would be offered to the expropriated U.S. oil companies. Mexico, however, did not observe the economic compensations, simply because it was not in the condition to fulfill them.
Despite the persistence of this uncomfortable situation, the international circumstances that led to World War II were becoming more dangerous, and for the United States it was more important to maintain the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy than to confront Mexico. Thus, direct intervention in Mexico was not considered an alternative. The U.S. took other measures against Mexico, such as closing the American oil and silver markets to Mexican production. However, these measures proved not very durable, as a result of the same factor above mentioned: the U.S. administration considered as a priority to maintain good relations with its southern neighbors under the new war conditions. This led to an accelerated U.S.-Mexican detente and to the establishment of a different type of relation between the two nations after 1940 (Knight, 1987: 18)

CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to answer a question such as which country, the United States or Mexico, gave up more in terms of what the Mexican Revolution was trying to put into practice. If we only consider the economic side of the problem, particularly, the protection of the U.S. economic interests in Mexico, then we can see that although the U.S., at some point, was able to manipulate the Mexican policy related to oil, and the land reform program in Mexico in its early years was limited, these conditions clearly changed during Cárdenas term. His agrarian program and the nationalization of oil industry made U.S. direct investment, which after the armed Revolution represented more than one thousand million dollars, to fall in more than a half—by 1940 it had decreased to about 300 million—(Vázquez and Meyer, 1982: 172). Why was this possible?

To answer this question we have to consider several factors. Although they were not the same, the similar ideologies held by the governments of both countries in parallel periods were crucial to maintain respect to Mexico’s radical policies, product of its Revolution. In particular, the U.S presidents in the two most radical periods of the Revolution (1913-1920 and 1934-1940), Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, were sympathetic to the development of Mexico as a country. Although they supported the protection of U.S. interests in Mexico, they had a more condescending view towards its neighbor, which was positive for the implementation of Mexico’s social programs. The ideological factor played a key role that not only favored Mexico, but also the U.S. In fact, during Morrow’s period, when Calles adopted a more rightist position, he accepted many of the issues demanded by the U.S. government. Two examples of this were: the modification of the Mexican oil law of 1925, which allowed the extension of oil extraction concessions to perpetuity to foreigners; and the signing of the peace agreement between the Mexican government and the church, which was also pressured by the U.S.

In addition, external events, particularly the two world wars, played chiefly in favor of Mexico. With World War I came the recognition of Carranza, the possibility of writing a nationalist Constitution and the end of the two major armed invasions: the
invasion of the port of Veracruz in 1914 and that of General Pershing in 1916. With the threat of World War II, Cárdenas was able to apply his radical policies and expropriate foreign oil companies, an event which can be described as the major Mexican stroke against an American economic interest in the period of study.

These two factors (similar ideologies and external events) were also important in avoiding U.S. direct intervention in Mexico after the armed Revolution and in minimizing the consequences of the interventions that took place between 1910 and 1920. Maybe an armed intervention under other conditions (absence of war or no ideological overlap) would have been disastrous for Mexico and for its revolutionary goals. We have to bear in mind that between 1910 and 1940 the revolutionary objectives of the different Mexican administrations changed. However, the coincidence of these changes with those that occurred in the objectives of the different U.S. governments in that period, and the existence of international wars, allowed, to some extent, the continuation in the progress of the various goals of the Mexican administrations. When there were no external counterbalances or when there was hostility from the U.S. administrations towards Mexico, as in Madero’s period or in part of the Sonoran dynasty period, the situation became much more harder for Mexico, which had to cede more to U.S. demands; for example, in the application of the Mexican oil legislation during the 1920’s.

Finally, it is important to stress the difficulty the U.S. had in controlling Mexican armed factions between 1910 and 1920. In fact, a greater leverage appeared after 1920 based on diplomatic recognition and power of money.

REFERENCES


